Trajectory Daily Brief: 31 January 2026

Middle East | Defence | US military strike capability against Iran degraded by Gulf ally base access denial

Situation

The United States maintains technical capacity to conduct military operations against Iranian targets without relying on Gulf-based infrastructure. However, operational realities have fundamentally altered the strategic equation.

Gulf allies are increasingly denying the US access to regional military bases for potential Iran operations. This shift transforms previously credible military threats into complex logistical challenges requiring extended supply lines and reduced operational flexibility.

What was once a straightforward deterrent posture now requires significantly more resources and planning to execute effectively.

Context

US military deterrence in the Gulf has historically relied on forward-positioned assets and allied base access to project credible threat of rapid response. The current access restrictions represent a fundamental shift in regional alliance dynamics.

Gulf states appear to be hedging between US security partnerships and regional stability concerns, prioritizing de-escalation over traditional alliance obligations. This mirrors broader Middle Eastern realignment as regional powers pursue independent foreign policies.

The erosion parallels similar challenges faced during the 2003 Iraq invasion, when Turkey denied base access, forcing costly operational adjustments. However, current restrictions affect the entire Gulf region rather than single ally.

Trajectory

Deterrence effectiveness will likely continue degrading as Iran recognizes operational constraints on US military options. Tehran may calculate increased room for regional provocations without triggering immediate military response.

The US faces strategic choice between accepting reduced deterrent credibility or investing in alternative power projection capabilities that bypass Gulf infrastructure entirely.

Regional allies’ base access denial signals broader recalibration of Middle East security architecture, potentially accelerating US pivot toward over-the-horizon capabilities and reduced regional military footprint.

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China | Military | Xi’s purge reduces war council to two members while gutting missile command

Situation

China’s Central Military Commission now effectively operates with just two members—Xi Jinping and anti-corruption enforcer Zhang Shengmin—after expelling He Weidong in October 2024. Since 2023, at least sixty senior military officers and defense executives have been removed in what Bloomberg calls “China’s biggest purge of military leaders since Mao.”

The Rocket Force, which controls China’s nuclear deterrent and conventional missiles critical for any Taiwan operation, has been gutted. Former commander Li Yuchao vanished from public view amid reports of defective fuel and falsified maintenance records.

Military procurement has stalled, with revenues at leading defense firms falling 10% in 2024 as anti-corruption investigations freeze contracts.

Context

This represents Xi’s most aggressive consolidation of military authority yet, transforming collective leadership into imperial-style personal control. Unlike previous purges targeting administrative posts, this wave strikes operational commands essential for combat readiness.

The pattern reveals Xi treating technical failures as moral failings—removing commanders for engineering problems like defective missile fuel rather than addressing root causes. This scapegoating satisfies political accountability while leaving underlying capability gaps unresolved.

Zhang Shengmin, the surviving vice chairman, built his career in political work, not warfighting. His appointment prioritizes hereditary loyalty over operational experience, reflecting Xi’s preference for personal bonds over professional competence in military leadership.

Trajectory

The purge creates contradictory effects that complicate invasion readiness assessments. While Xi gains unprecedented control over war-making authority, the PLA faces degraded command networks and risk-averse officers who fear initiative more than enemies.

Amphibious operations require decentralized decision-making and precise coordination—capabilities undermined by organizational silence and disrupted human networks. The 2027 capability deadline for Taiwan operations may slip as technical problems persist despite leadership changes.

Intelligence analysts should expect continued military exercises around Taiwan as political theater, while actual invasion readiness likely deteriorates behind the facade of consolidated command authority.

Indo-Pacific | Defense | Xi’s military purges create brittleness ahead of 2027 Taiwan readiness deadline

Situation

General Zhang Youxia, Xi Jinping’s childhood friend and second-ranking military official, became the latest casualty in an accelerating purge of China’s military elite in January 2026. The Central Military Commission now retains only one of its original six members besides Xi himself.

Since 2023, at least 17 generals have fallen, including eight former top commission members. The Rocket Force—critical to any Taiwan operation—has been particularly devastated, with commanders and senior officers swept away in waves.

The purges systematically target officers with independent power bases and institutional knowledge, not merely corruption, as Xi conflates disloyalty with “grave violations of discipline.”

Context

Military organizations depend on tacit knowledge accumulated over decades—how to coordinate complex operations, which subordinates merit trust, where logistics bottlenecks hide. This institutional wisdom cannot be taught in classrooms or downloaded from databases.

The purges destroy this knowledge base precisely when China needs it most. Officers watching colleagues disappear adopt rational paralysis, avoiding bold decisions that might later be characterized as corrupt or disloyal. This creates a feedback loop where Xi centralizes more authority, subordinates become more passive, and the system grows increasingly brittle.

Historical parallels to Stalin’s 1937-38 Red Army purges are instructive. Stalin eliminated 35,000 officers; when Germany invaded, catastrophic performance nearly destroyed the Soviet Union.

Trajectory

Xi’s 2027 Taiwan readiness deadline creates a metabolic mismatch. Political purges move fast, but leadership development requires 25-30 years. The officers who would command any Taiwan operation are already in uniform—removing their superiors and mentors doesn’t improve their capabilities.

China lacks the Soviet Union’s strategic depth to absorb initial failures. Taiwan sits 100 miles away with no space to trade for time. A brittle military that cannot adapt may simply escalate faster when plans fail, making miscalculation more likely than tactical success.

Pacific | Indo-Pacific | Pentagon’s China deprioritization creates credibility gap as allies face immediate threats

Situation

The 2026 National Defense Strategy demotes China from top priority to second place, elevating homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere above Indo-Pacific concerns. Pentagon language has shifted from “pacing threat” to “regional concern” requiring “realistic diplomacy” and “de-escalation.”

Meanwhile, regional allies experience escalating Chinese pressure. Philippine vessels face routine ramming and boarding at Second Thomas Shoal. Japan identifies China as its “greatest strategic challenge” and is doubling defense spending. Australia maintains tactical diplomatic stability with Beijing while pursuing AUKUS and defense reviews premised on Chinese military expansion.

Context

This creates a metabolic mismatch between American strategic timelines and allied operational realities. The US can afford to deprioritize China due to Pacific Ocean strategic depth, but Japan, Philippines, and Taiwan experience Chinese coercion continuously and viscerally.

Alliance credibility operates on a spectrum constantly being tested. When Washington signals reduced prioritization, Beijing may interpret this as reduced commitment rather than diplomatic outreach. Chinese gray-zone operations specifically exploit the gap between alliance promises and actual responses.

The timing compounds the problem. Regional allies view China’s 2027 PLA modernization goals as compressing decision timelines, while US electoral cycles enable strategic pivots that geographically fixed allies cannot afford.

Trajectory

Allies are already hedging against perceived American uncertainty. Japan pursues counterstrike capabilities, South Korea debates nuclear latency, and Australia binds the US through AUKUS industrial partnerships.

This rational response to abandonment fears could fragment the alliance system. When every member hedges rather than specializes based on shared threat assessment, collective defense becomes individual insurance policies.

The credibility fracture may encourage Chinese testing of alliance cohesion through expanded gray-zone operations, creating the very confrontations the Pentagon’s de-escalation strategy seeks to avoid.

Yesterday’s Assessments

• Can the united states strike Iran without gulf bases, and does deterrence still hold?
• Can America strike Iran without Gulf bases? The uncomfortable arithmetic of Middle East deterrence

Until tomorrow.