Trajectory Daily Brief: 24 January 2026
Japan builds hypersonic missiles while China deploys zero warships to America's backyard—yet US debates resource allocation as Taiwan bleeds spies.
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Japan | Defence | Hypersonic missile program breaks from defensive posture despite constitutional constraints
Situation
Japan successfully test-launched its Hyper Velocity Gliding Projectile in July 2024, marking a shift toward offensive capabilities. The truck-launched hypersonic weapon can strike targets hundreds of kilometers away and will deploy in two blocks—anti-ship missions by 2026, followed by land-attack capability.
The program stems from Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy, which introduced “counterstrike capability” as official doctrine. This represents a doctrinal break from seven decades of exclusively defensive positioning under Article 9 constitutional constraints.
Chinese J-15 jets locked fire-control radar on Japanese F-15s near Okinawa in December 2025, highlighting escalating regional tensions that justify the program domestically.
Context
Japan has historically maintained constitutional fiction around Article 9’s war renunciation through semantic camouflage—building capable forces while restricting them rhetorically to self-defense. This served to reassure war-traumatized domestic audiences and regional neighbors while minimizing alliance burden-sharing.
These justifications have eroded as China’s military buildup accelerates and American security guarantees face scrutiny. The 2015 collective self-defense reinterpretation and 2022 counterstrike doctrine formalize this evolution.
However, weapons designed for American operational concepts against Chinese targets create perception gaps. Beijing reads capability, not constitutional constraints. Historical memory of Japanese occupation compounds Chinese threat assessment, regardless of Tokyo’s defensive framing.
Trajectory
The program creates alliance coordination challenges around targeting, escalation control, and command relationships that remain classified. Japan contributes desired capabilities but integration complexity grows.
Escalation risks emerge from compressed decision timelines. Chinese planners must assume worst-case scenarios, driving countermeasures that validate Japanese threat perceptions in a tightening spiral.
The timing particularly problematizes Taiwan scenarios where Xi Jinping has tied resolution to regime legitimacy. Japan’s hypersonic capability enters this environment as an accelerant rather than stabilizing deterrent.
Indo-Pacific | Intelligence | Taiwan espionage surge creates US intelligence sharing dilemma
Situation
Taiwan charged 64 individuals with espionage in 2024, with military personnel comprising the majority of cases. This represents a significant counterintelligence challenge as Chinese penetration of Taiwan’s defense establishment appears extensive.
The espionage wave coincides with deepening US-Taiwan intelligence cooperation. Washington has expanded information sharing with Taipei as part of broader efforts to strengthen Taiwan’s defensive capabilities against potential Chinese invasion.
Every intelligence asset shared with Taiwan now carries heightened risk of compromise, creating a strategic dilemma for US policymakers weighing deterrence benefits against operational security costs.
Context
Military espionage cases in Taiwan have historically been episodic, but the 2024 surge suggests systematic Chinese intelligence operations targeting the island’s defense infrastructure. Beijing’s intelligence services appear to have successfully recruited across Taiwan’s military hierarchy.
US intelligence sharing with partners always involves calculated risks, but Taiwan presents unique vulnerabilities. Unlike NATO allies with mature counterintelligence capabilities, Taiwan operates under constant Chinese pressure and infiltration attempts.
The timing is particularly problematic as US military planners increasingly rely on Taiwan’s forces as integral to regional defense strategies. Effective deterrence requires Taiwan to understand US capabilities and intentions, yet this same knowledge becomes valuable to Chinese war planners if compromised.
Trajectory
Washington faces an impossible choice between operational security and alliance effectiveness. Restricting intelligence sharing weakens Taiwan’s defensive posture, while continued cooperation risks exposing US capabilities to Beijing.
The Pentagon will likely implement compartmentalized sharing protocols, limiting Taiwan’s access to the most sensitive intelligence while maintaining tactical cooperation. This represents a significant downgrade from full partnership models.
Long-term US strategy may shift toward intelligence products specifically designed for potentially compromised channels, accepting that Beijing will gain access while ensuring core American advantages remain protected.
Pacific | Naval Strategy | Chinese Western Hemisphere presence consists of infrastructure, not warships, yet drives US resource allocation debates
Situation
China operates no documented naval combat presence in the Western Hemisphere during 2020-2024, according to open source analysis. Activities consist primarily of humanitarian missions like the Ark Silk Road hospital ship and routine port calls to Brazil.
What China has built is commercial infrastructure. The Chancay megaport in Peru opened in November 2024, operated by COSCO Shipping. Chinese-manufactured cranes dominate ports from Buenos Aires to Long Beach, with congressional investigators finding unexplained cellular modems in equipment.
US Southern Command tracks this “shadow fleet” of commercial activity while the Pacific Fleet maintains 200 ships focused on deterring actual Chinese military expansion in the South China Sea.
Context
The Pentagon’s allocation debate reveals more about American strategic culture than Chinese capability. SOUTHCOM must justify its mission by identifying regional threats, while INDOPACOM guards Pacific resources jealously, creating competing institutional narratives.
The real constraint on US naval power isn’t Chinese hospital ships in Nicaragua—it’s shipyard capacity, crew retention, and industrial production limits. Dynamic Force Employment allows surge capabilities without permanent redeployment, meaning Pacific deterrence continues uninterrupted.
Chinese port infrastructure creates dual-use potential and intelligence collection opportunities rather than immediate military threats. A port can theoretically become a naval base, but no evidence suggests conversion or host nation consent for military use.
Trajectory
The vulnerability is informational and economic, not military. Chinese port management systems and logistics platforms provide data collection capabilities that matter more than warship movements.
Resource allocation should reflect actual rather than theoretical threats. Every destroyer diverted to shadow commercial shipping is unavailable for South China Sea operations where deterrence actually matters.
The solution lies in industrial policy—replacing Chinese infrastructure dependencies—rather than naval redeployment. Pacific deterrence requires focusing finite assets where China poses genuine military challenges, not chasing commercial shadows across two hemispheres.
Global | Defence | US forward deployment creates asymmetric vulnerabilities across allied territories
Situation
China maintains no military installations in the Western Hemisphere, while the United States operates extensive forward-deployed assets across the Indo-Pacific region. Gulf allies hosting American military bases are actively lobbying Washington against conducting strikes on Iranian targets, despite escalating regional tensions.
Australia currently hosts high-value US military assets, including strategic bombers and intelligence facilities, that exceed its independent defensive capabilities. These installations represent critical nodes in America’s regional deterrence architecture but rely entirely on US protection systems.
Context
The asymmetry reveals a fundamental strategic imbalance: America’s global posture creates numerous vulnerable points that adversaries can exploit without reciprocal exposure. Historical precedent shows forward-deployed assets become liabilities when host nations cannot adequately defend them independently.
Gulf allies’ resistance to Iran strikes demonstrates how hosting US forces can constrain rather than enable American military options. These nations fear retaliation against US bases on their territory, creating diplomatic leverage that limits Washington’s operational flexibility.
Australia’s situation exemplifies the broader challenge of alliance burden-sharing in an era of precision-strike warfare, where high-value targets require increasingly sophisticated defensive systems.
Trajectory
Forward deployment strategies designed for previous eras may prove counterproductive against peer adversaries capable of precision strikes across vast distances. Host nations increasingly view US military presence as creating rather than reducing security risks.
America faces growing pressure to either substantially increase defensive investments at allied bases or reconsider the forward deployment model entirely. The current arrangement provides adversaries with multiple high-value targets while constraining US operational freedom through allied political considerations.
Yesterday’s Assessments
- Japan’s hypersonic weapons compress China’s decision timeline from hours to minutes, creating the crisis instability both sides claim to prevent
- Japan’s hypersonic missiles blur the line between defense and attack
Until tomorrow.
