Trajectory Daily Brief: 23 January 2026

Pacific | Defence | China’s Western Hemisphere presence remains commercially focused despite US concerns over naval asset diversion

Situation

China operates no documented naval combat presence in the Western Hemisphere, with activities limited to humanitarian missions like the hospital ship Ark Silk Road and routine port calls. The November 2024 opening of China’s Chancay megaport in Peru represents the largest maritime infrastructure investment, creating direct Pacific shipping routes between South America and Asia.

US Southern Command tracks Chinese commercial expansion while maintaining that long-term strategic competition poses regional challenges. Current Pacific Fleet deployments show carriers Abraham Lincoln and Carl Vinson operating in South China Sea and Philippine Sea respectively, with no diversions to Western Hemisphere operations.

Context

The debate over resource allocation reflects institutional dynamics rather than operational necessity. SOUTHCOM requires threat justification for budget purposes while INDOPACOM guards Pacific-focused resources, creating competing narratives about Chinese activities.

The real strategic concern involves dual-use infrastructure rather than warships. Chinese port management systems, ZPMC cranes with unexplained cellular modems, and logistics platforms create intelligence collection opportunities. However, ports remain commercial facilities without evidence of military conversion or host nation approval for such changes.

Dynamic Force Employment doctrine allows surge capabilities without static global presence, meaning Pacific deterrence doesn’t require permanent Western Hemisphere diversions. The Navy’s actual constraints involve shipyard capacity and industrial production limits, not Chinese hospital ships in Nicaragua.

Trajectory

Pentagon planners risk strategic misdirection by treating commercial infrastructure as immediate military threats. The focus should remain on Pacific deterrence where China’s actual naval capabilities concentrate, not shadowing humanitarian missions in Latin America.

Infrastructure vulnerabilities require industrial policy responses—replacing Chinese cranes and port systems—rather than naval redeployment. The $10 billion Pacific Deterrence Initiative represents appropriate resource prioritization.

The phantom fleet problem reveals more about American strategic culture than Chinese naval expansion. Maintaining Pacific focus while addressing infrastructure dependencies through economic tools offers the clearest path forward.

Europe | Defense | EU defense spending hits record levels but structural financing gaps persist despite Trump’s Greenland pressure

Situation

Trump’s renewed demands for Greenland have triggered emergency EU defense sessions and accelerated spending commitments across Europe. EU defense spending reached a record €279 billion in 2023, with projections of €326 billion for 2024. Eighteen NATO members now meet the 2% GDP target, up from eleven previously.

Germany announced additional spending within weeks of Trump’s statements, while France renewed calls for joint EU debt issuance for defense. The European Commission proposed retraining 600,000 workers for the defense sector by 2030.

Context

European strategic autonomy has remained largely rhetorical since its 2016 formalization, accumulating institutional architecture without material substance. Europe has underinvested approximately €1.8 trillion in defense over three decades while declaring autonomy intentions.

The EU’s defense industrial base suffers from financing difficulties, with banks reluctant to lend to arms manufacturers at competitive rates. Structural constraints include the Stability and Growth Pact’s deficit limits and democratic pressure favoring welfare spending over defense.

Trump’s approach treats legal constraints as negotiating positions, operating on immediate timelines that clash with Europe’s seven-year budget cycles and decade-long procurement processes.

Trajectory

The psychological shift from aspirational to existential autonomy may prove more significant than policy changes. Defense spending increases that would have triggered political crises now pass with minimal opposition.

However, Europe’s defense industrial base cannot absorb rapid budget increases without years of preparation. Production capacity requires skilled workers who need training, creating an irreducible temporal gap between spending and capability.

The acceleration exposes the core contradiction: Europe seeks strategic independence while maintaining fiscal and industrial structures designed for American dependency.

China | Conflict | Australia’s US military facilities create unavoidable target status in potential war

Situation

Australia hosts critical US military infrastructure that directly supports American warfighting capabilities in the Pacific. These facilities include intelligence gathering stations, communications hubs, and strategic military bases that are integral to US operations.

Beijing views these installations as legitimate military targets that would require neutralization in any serious conflict with the United States. The same strategic value that makes Australia an essential ally to Washington simultaneously creates vulnerability to Chinese strikes.

Context

Australia’s geographic position and alliance infrastructure place it in an impossible strategic bind. Unlike the continental United States, which possesses vast territory and redundant systems to absorb attacks, Australia’s smaller landmass and concentrated critical infrastructure offer fewer options for resilience.

The facilities in question likely include Pine Gap intelligence station, naval communications centers, and emerging missile defense installations. These represent decades of alliance integration that cannot be easily relocated or abandoned.

Historical precedent suggests that host nations of critical military infrastructure become automatic participants in conflicts, regardless of their preferred neutrality. Australia’s situation mirrors smaller NATO allies during the Cold War—valuable precisely because of their strategic position, vulnerable for the same reason.

Trajectory

Australia faces a fundamental strategic reality that neutrality is no longer a viable option in US-China competition. The infrastructure investment that strengthens the alliance also eliminates strategic ambiguity about Australia’s role in any conflict.

This dynamic will likely accelerate Australian defense spending and hardening of critical facilities. Canberra must prepare for the possibility that alliance benefits come with unavoidable risks that cannot be mitigated through diplomatic positioning alone.

Read the full analysis →

Middle East | Analysis | Gulf states lobby against Iran strikes despite hosting US bases and buying American weapons

Situation

Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Qatar are actively pressuring Washington to avoid military action against Iran, despite hosting American military bases and depending on US security guarantees. This apparent contradiction reflects structural vulnerabilities rather than simple fear of retaliation.

The September 2019 Houthi attack on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq facility demonstrated Gulf fragility when 18 drones temporarily knocked out half of Saudi oil production, bypassing US-supplied air defenses. Meanwhile, economic interdependencies have deepened—Qatar shares the world’s largest gas field with Iran, while Dubai serves as Iran’s commercial lifeline through re-export trade.

Context

The Strait of Hormuz chokepoint carries 20% of global daily oil consumption, with Iran controlling the northern shore. Any conflict would immediately threaten the export routes sustaining Gulf economies, while their desalination plants, glass towers, and oil terminals present soft targets built for investment attraction rather than military defense.

Gulf monarchies operate on generational timescales, understanding that Iran’s 85 million people and territorial depth make it a permanent neighbor regardless of American political cycles. They have watched US commitments prove conditional—from abandoning the Shah in 1979 to withdrawing from Afghanistan—while Iran’s strategic culture enables multi-decade resistance strategies.

American Iran policy oscillates between administrations, forcing Gulf states to repeatedly recalibrate relationships they spend years cultivating.

Trajectory

This structural misalignment between American and Gulf interests will likely persist regardless of Washington’s Iran approach. Gulf states have learned that absorbing damage for American actions they oppose creates existential risks their regimes cannot survive.

The temporal mismatch means Gulf rulers will continue hedging strategies, maintaining US security partnerships while quietly building accommodation with Iran. Their sovereign wealth funds’ exposure to Western financial systems creates additional incentives to avoid regional conflict that would trigger capital flight and insurance premium spikes.

American policymakers expecting enthusiastic Gulf support for Iran confrontation will face persistent disappointment as regional allies prioritize regime survival over alliance solidarity.

Yesterday’s Assessments

• China’s Western hemisphere naval presence extracts minimal US Pacific diversions—for now
• China’s phantom fleet: Why chasing shadows in Latin America weakens Pacific deterrence

Until tomorrow.