Trajectory Daily Brief: 22 January 2026

China | Defence | Infrastructure expansion continues despite India’s military spending advantage due to bilateral agreements prohibiting force

Situation

China has accelerated infrastructure construction along the disputed Line of Actual Control since the 2017 Doklam standoff, building roads, helipads, barracks, and dual-use “well-off villages” in contested territory. India cannot use military force to stop this construction due to 1993 and 1996 bilateral agreements that prohibit firearms and explosives within two kilometers of the LAC.

Despite India ranking fourth globally in military power compared to China’s third place, Beijing outspends New Delhi on defense by nearly 4:1 ($318 billion versus $83.6 billion in 2024). The June 2020 Galwan Valley clash, where soldiers fought with rocks and clubs rather than firearms, exemplified how these agreements constrain India’s response options.

Context

The bilateral accords designed to prevent war have created an environment where infrastructure becomes the primary weapon system. China transforms contested territory into administered space through permanent settlements, forcing India to choose between accepting territorial claims or escalating against civilian targets.

Geography favors China’s strategy. Chinese forces operate from the 4,500-meter Tibetan Plateau with permanent garrisons and acclimatization advantages, while Indian troops rotate through on duty cycles from lower altitudes. China’s centralized system can sustain multi-decade infrastructure projects, while India’s democratic electoral cycles prioritize immediate welfare spending over long-term frontier development.

The nuclear dimension reinforces this dynamic—both nations’ nuclear capabilities make large-scale conventional war unthinkable, which paradoxically makes small-scale territorial advances through construction safer and more effective.

Trajectory

China’s infrastructure-first approach will likely accelerate as new technologies like the Tianma-1000 cargo drone improve high-altitude logistics capabilities. India’s oxygen logistics vulnerabilities and rotating troop deployments will remain structural disadvantages regardless of overall military spending.

The precedent established along the LAC may influence other territorial disputes where legal frameworks constrain military responses. Infrastructure competition below the threshold of armed conflict represents a new form of territorial conquest that traditional military metrics fail to capture or counter.

Europe | Defence | Trump’s Greenland pressure exposes Europe’s defense spending constraints despite strategic autonomy rhetoric

Situation

Trump has declared Greenland acquisition a “national security priority” and refused to rule out military force, creating an unexpected stress test for European strategic autonomy. European leaders responded with diplomatic indignation and renewed autonomy rhetoric, but lack material capacity to counter American pressure.

EU defense spending hit record levels of €279 billion in 2023, projected at €326 billion for 2024. However, the European Defence Agency calculates EU members have underinvested by €1.8 trillion since the Cold War ended. Eighteen of thirty-two NATO members now meet the 2% GDP spending target, but percentage compliance differs from actual capability.

Context

Europe’s fiscal architecture actively prevents the defense investment that strategic autonomy requires. The Stability and Growth Pact limits deficits to 3% of GDP, while the ECB focuses on price stability rather than strategic capacity. No fiscal union or common defense borrowing mechanism exists.

Greenland’s strategic value compounds the problem—it controls critical Arctic flight paths, houses irreplaceable early warning systems at Thule Air Base, and contains rare earth deposits essential for advanced weapons. Europe depends on Chinese supply chains for 90% of rare earth processing, making Greenland’s resources strategically significant.

The defense industrial base remains fragmented across twenty-seven national markets with different standards, preventing economies of scale that American and Chinese competitors achieve.

Trajectory

The Greenland crisis reveals strategic autonomy as aspiration without funding mechanism. European democracies operate on four-year electoral cycles while strategic autonomy requires decade-long investment horizons—a temporal mismatch that declarations cannot resolve.

Europe faces watching from sidelines while others determine Arctic futures. The EU’s €4 billion European Defence Fund represents coordination at the margin, not industrial base transformation. Without fiscal architecture reform, European strategic autonomy remains financially unviable regardless of political will.

Global | Defence | Allied resolve strengthens while military capabilities decline across key theaters

Situation

Pacific allies are implementing tougher diplomatic and economic measures against China while simultaneously experiencing degraded military readiness due to aging equipment, recruitment shortfalls, and delayed modernization programs. Key partners including Japan, Australia, and South Korea show increased political will but reduced operational capacity.

Trump’s renewed Greenland acquisition efforts have triggered emergency EU defense spending commitments that exceed available budgets by an estimated 40%. European capitals are scrambling to fund accelerated Arctic capabilities and strategic autonomy initiatives without clear financing mechanisms.

Gulf monarchies continue hosting expanded US military infrastructure while actively lobbying Washington against preemptive strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, creating operational constraints on American regional strategy.

Context

This pattern reveals a fundamental disconnect between geopolitical ambitions and military realities that historically precedes strategic miscalculations. The 1930s saw similar gaps between Allied resolve and preparedness, with political commitments outpacing actual defensive capabilities.

The Greenland crisis exposes Europe’s chronic underinvestment in defense industrial capacity. EU members lack the production infrastructure to rapidly scale military capabilities, making spending pledges largely symbolic without 5-7 year lead times.

Gulf states’ dual approach reflects their vulnerability to Iranian retaliation despite hosting US forces. Their lobbying efforts mirror Cold War proxy dynamics where regional allies constrained superpower actions to protect local interests, often undermining broader strategic objectives.

Trajectory

Allied political unity may prove brittle when tested by actual conflict scenarios where capability gaps become decisive factors. Current defense commitments risk becoming unfunded mandates that erode credibility rather than enhance deterrence.

The financing crisis in European defense spending will likely force difficult choices between social programs and military modernization, potentially fracturing NATO consensus on burden-sharing.

Regional allies’ constraints on US military options signal a shift toward more limited, negotiated responses to adversary actions, reducing American strategic flexibility in multiple theaters simultaneously.

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Pacific | Defence | Allied resolve against China outpaces missile production capacity

Situation

Political commitment to resist Chinese aggression is strengthening across key US Pacific allies. Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia are demonstrating increased willingness to confront Beijing militarily if necessary.

However, this growing resolve is not matched by industrial capacity to sustain extended conflict. Current missile production rates across these nations remain insufficient to support the intensity and duration of warfare their political leaders are prepared to wage.

Context

This mismatch between political will and industrial capacity represents a critical vulnerability in Pacific deterrence architecture. Historical precedent shows that ammunition shortages, not battlefield losses, often determine conflict outcomes—as seen in Ukraine’s early dependence on Western supplies.

The gap is particularly acute given China’s massive missile inventory and production capacity. While allies have committed to defence spending increases, munitions manufacturing requires years to scale meaningfully. Complex supply chains, specialized components, and skilled workforce requirements cannot be rapidly expanded.

Unlike previous conflicts where geographic distance provided time to mobilize industry, any Pacific confrontation would likely begin with immediate, intensive missile exchanges that could exhaust stockpiles within days.

Trajectory

This industrial-political disconnect will likely force uncomfortable strategic choices. Allies may need to accept either reduced conflict intensity or shorter engagement windows than their political rhetoric suggests.

Expect accelerated munitions stockpiling agreements and co-production partnerships, but these remain years from meaningful impact. The immediate implication is that deterrence credibility rests on a narrower foundation than allied statements indicate.

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Until tomorrow.