Trajectory Daily Brief: 08 February 2026

Indian Ocean | Geopolitics | Trump’s Chagos obstruction threatens Diego Garcia base security more than UK-US relations

Situation

The UK-Mauritius treaty signed May 22, 2025, transfers Chagos Archipelago sovereignty to Mauritius while preserving UK control of Diego Garcia military base for 99 years. The US officially welcomed the agreement through Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

Trump subsequently called the deal “great stupidity” and threatened military force to maintain the base. His obstruction tools are limited—economic pressure through tariffs, diplomatic sabotage, or military posturing—but delay through British parliamentary opposition offers a viable blocking mechanism.

The treaty requires no US signature and changes nothing operationally at Diego Garcia, where 2,500 American personnel continue their mission unchanged.

Context

Three critical systems are colliding over this 44-square-kilometer atoll: alliance management, international law, and military basing strategy. The 2019 International Court of Justice ruled Britain’s 1965 detachment of Chagos unlawful, with the UN General Assembly demanding withdrawal.

Diego Garcia represents America’s only Indian Ocean military base, supporting operations across Middle East, East Africa, and Southeast Asia theaters. Its strategic bombers, nuclear submarines, and resupply facilities are irreplaceable for power projection.

Western analysis consistently underestimates Mauritian agency. The nation pursued sovereignty claims for decades through multiple forums, demonstrating strategic persistence rather than passive waiting for great-power permission.

Trajectory

Paradoxically, Trump’s obstruction undermines the very basing strategy he claims to protect. The treaty removes legal uncertainty and secures 99-year access—exactly what military planners need for long-term operations.

Blocking the agreement preserves contested sovereignty, unresolved Mauritian grievances, and potential Chinese involvement as Mauritius’s infrastructure partner. This creates the strategic uncertainty the Pentagon sought to avoid.

UK-US relations will survive but become more transactional. International law norms face erosion rather than rupture. Indian Ocean basing strategy bears the highest cost, trading guaranteed long-term access for short-term sovereignty symbolism.

Indo-Pacific | Conflict | Taiwan’s asymmetric defense creates 10-14 day delay against invasion but matches US intervention timeline

Situation

Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare strategy can extend Chinese amphibious invasion operations to 10-14 days, according to current defense assessments. This represents a significant delay from rapid conquest scenarios that Beijing might prefer.

American military intervention in a Taiwan strait conflict requires a minimum of 7-14 days to deploy meaningful forces to the theater. The overlap between Taiwan’s defensive duration and US deployment timelines creates a narrow but critical window.

Beijing’s optimal strategy focuses on decapitation strikes to exploit this timing gap, targeting Taiwan’s command structure before sustained resistance can develop.

Context

Asymmetric defense strategies have historically proven effective at delaying superior conventional forces, from Finland’s Winter War resistance to Ukraine’s current defense against Russia. Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and urban density favor defensive operations over amphibious assault.

The US military’s Pacific positioning reflects post-Cold War assumptions about intervention timelines that may not match current threat scenarios. Forward-deployed forces in Japan and Guam provide rapid response capability, but major reinforcements require trans-Pacific deployment.

China’s military modernization has prioritized precision strike capabilities specifically designed to disrupt command structures and prevent organized resistance during the critical opening phase of conflict.

Trajectory

Taiwan’s defensive planning must account for surviving the initial 72-96 hours when decapitation strikes pose maximum threat. Distributed command structures and hardened communications become essential for maintaining resistance beyond the opening phase.

US force posture adjustments may accelerate, with increased forward positioning and pre-positioned equipment to compress intervention timelines. The narrow gap incentivizes both sides to optimize for the opening hours of conflict.

The timing dynamics favor scenarios where conflict escalation occurs rapidly, potentially limiting diplomatic off-ramps once military operations begin.

Read the full analysis →

Middle East | Nuclear | Regional proliferation risks outpacing great-power arms control collapse

Situation

US-Russia arms control frameworks are deteriorating rapidly, with New START treaty extensions uncertain and intermediate-range missile agreements already defunct. This breakdown threatens both strategic stability between major nuclear powers and non-proliferation efforts in regional hotspots.

The mechanisms driving each risk operate on different timelines. Great-power nuclear competition follows decades-long modernization cycles, while regional proliferation can accelerate within years once political decisions are made.

Context

Most strategic analysis focuses on US-Russia-China nuclear dynamics, but the more immediate danger may emerge from regional cascade effects. When great powers abandon arms control, it signals to regional actors that nuclear restraint is no longer a shared international norm.

Middle Eastern states are particularly sensitive to these signals given Iran’s nuclear program and Israel’s undeclared arsenal. Saudi Arabia has explicitly linked its nuclear ambitions to Iranian capabilities, while Turkey and Egypt maintain latent programs.

Historical precedent suggests regional nuclear breakouts often surprise intelligence communities focused on great-power competition, as with India’s 1998 tests during US-Russia détente.

Trajectory

Regional proliferation timelines are compressing while great-power competition remains constrained by massive arsenals and mutual vulnerability. A Middle Eastern nuclear cascade could unfold within this decade, fundamentally altering global nuclear order.

The collapse of superpower arms control removes diplomatic tools for managing regional proliferation. Without credible US-Russia cooperation, multilateral non-proliferation efforts lose legitimacy and enforcement mechanisms.

Read the full analysis →

China | Geopolitics | Australia-Indonesia security treaty formalizes hedging without strategic alignment

Situation

Australia and Indonesia have concluded a security treaty emphasizing operational military cooperation while avoiding deeper strategic commitments. The agreement provides Indonesia access to Australian military technology and modernization assistance.

Jakarta maintains its traditional non-aligned foreign policy stance, refusing to choose sides in great power competition. Australia secures a regional partnership that operates independently of US alliance structures, demonstrating alternative pathways for regional security cooperation.

Context

Indonesia’s approach reflects classic middle power hedging—extracting benefits from multiple partners while avoiding entangling commitments. This mirrors ASEAN’s broader strategy of engaging all major powers without exclusive alignment.

For Australia, the treaty represents diplomatic diversification beyond the AUKUS framework. Canberra demonstrates that regional security architecture need not be purely US-centric, potentially appealing to Southeast Asian states wary of binary choices between Washington and Beijing.

The agreement highlights China’s limited ability to prevent regional security cooperation, even as it avoids direct containment. Beijing faces the challenge of countering partnerships that don’t explicitly target Chinese interests but nonetheless strengthen regional defense capabilities.

Trajectory

The treaty establishes a template for “alignment-free” security cooperation that other regional states may adopt. This could accelerate the development of flexible, issue-specific partnerships rather than rigid alliance blocs.

China will likely respond by intensifying economic engagement with Indonesia while avoiding actions that push Jakarta toward harder security commitments. The model suggests regional order may evolve toward overlapping partnerships rather than competing spheres of influence.

Read the full analysis →

Yesterday’s Assessments

• Trump versus the Chagos treaty: What breaks when a president fights his own policy
• Can Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare strategy buy enough time for American intervention?
• Taiwan’s 72-hour gamble: Can asymmetric defence hold until America arrives?

Until tomorrow.