Trajectory Daily Brief: 07 February 2026

China | Geopolitics | Australia-Indonesia treaty formalizes Jakarta’s hedging without constraining Beijing

Situation

Australia and Indonesia have concluded a security treaty that establishes operational military cooperation while avoiding strategic alignment. The agreement provides Indonesia access to Australian military technology and modernization assistance.

Jakarta maintains its traditional non-alignment policy under the arrangement. Australia secures a diplomatic framework for regional partnership that operates independently of US alliance structures.

Context

Indonesia’s approach reflects the broader Southeast Asian preference for hedging between great powers rather than choosing sides. Jakarta has consistently avoided exclusive partnerships that might limit its strategic autonomy or provoke Beijing’s response.

For Australia, the treaty demonstrates an alternative model of regional engagement beyond the AUKUS framework. This matters as Canberra seeks to build influence across Southeast Asia where many nations remain wary of explicitly anti-China coalitions.

The agreement follows Indonesia’s pattern of accepting military cooperation while rejecting alliance commitments—similar to its approach with China, India, and other major powers.

Trajectory

The treaty legitimizes hedging as a viable long-term strategy rather than forcing binary choices between Washington and Beijing. This may encourage other Southeast Asian nations to pursue similar arrangements.

China faces no immediate constraint but confronts a more complex regional environment where middle powers gain leverage through diversified partnerships. Beijing’s influence remains substantial but less exclusive.

Australia’s model could reshape regional diplomacy by proving that meaningful cooperation doesn’t require choosing sides in great power competition.

Read the full analysis →

Europe | Defence | NATO’s counter-drone procurement cannot match commercial drone proliferation speed

Situation

NATO has tested over 60 counter-drone systems across 19 member nations since 2023 and established its first procurement framework for counter-UAS equipment. Ukraine now produces 10 million drones annually, up from 800,000 two years earlier, with 80-85% of frontline targets engaged by unmanned systems.

Commercial drones cost $300-500 and operators train in weeks, while NATO counter-drone systems cost millions, require months of training, and take 18-24 months to procure. Ukraine’s fiber-optic FPV drones and AI-targeting systems iterate from testing to battlefield deployment within days.

Context

NATO’s procurement architecture was designed for billion-dollar platforms with decade-long development cycles, not disposable $400 threats that evolve weekly. The alliance’s greatest strength—interoperability across 32 nations—becomes a liability when systems must undergo STANAG compliance testing while threats rapidly evolve.

China produces 70-80% of global commercial drones, generating $29.4 billion in output during 2024 alone. The proliferation curve is exponential while NATO’s institutional response remains linear. Ukrainian innovations cannot simply be adopted by NATO forces without extensive certification processes that stretch feedback loops from days to years.

Trajectory

NATO faces a fundamental choice between institutional coherence and battlefield adaptability. Current procurement reforms accelerate acquisition from “glacial to merely slow” while adversaries operate inside NATO’s decision cycle.

The alliance must either dramatically compress certification timelines or accept that counter-drone warfare will remain an asymmetric vulnerability. Traditional Western advantages in engineering excellence become irrelevant when the operational environment changes faster than institutional approval processes can adapt.

Pacific | Indo-Pacific | Australia faces months-long communications blackout with Pacific partners if China severs subsea cables

Situation

Australia cannot maintain secure communications with Pacific island partners at pre-crisis levels if China cuts undersea cables during a Taiwan conflict. Current repair timelines would extend from the standard few weeks to several months.

Insurance companies will refuse to deploy cable repair ships into active conflict zones, creating extended outages. This leaves Australia’s Pacific communication infrastructure vulnerable to prolonged disruption during the most critical period for coordination.

Context

Subsea cables carry over 95% of international communications traffic, making them critical infrastructure for military and diplomatic coordination. Australia’s Pacific strategy relies heavily on real-time intelligence sharing and coordination with island partners during crises.

Historical precedent shows cable repairs in contested waters face massive delays. During peacetime, cable breaks typically take 2-4 weeks to repair. However, conflict zones create insurance liability issues that can ground repair fleets indefinitely. The Pacific’s vast distances compound this vulnerability, as alternative communication methods like satellite have limited bandwidth and security concerns.

Trajectory

Australia must develop redundant communication systems before any Taiwan crisis materializes. Satellite constellations and alternative routing through non-contested cables become strategic imperatives rather than backup options.

The vulnerability exposes a critical gap in Australia’s Pacific security architecture. Without reliable communications, coordinated responses with island partners become nearly impossible, potentially ceding regional influence to China during the conflict’s most decisive phase.

Read the full analysis →

Indo-Pacific | Conflict | Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare doctrine faces implementation gaps and untested political will

Situation

Taiwan’s military has embraced asymmetric warfare concepts under the Overall Defense Concept (ODC), emphasizing cheap, dispersible weapons like mobile missiles and sea mines over expensive fighter jets and destroyers. The strategy aims to make Chinese invasion prohibitively costly through “porcupine” tactics.

However, implementation has stalled. Admiral Lee Hsi-min’s concrete proposals—including 60 micro missile boats—were shelved after his 2019 retirement. Taiwan’s 2023 National Defense Report dilutes ODC principles, with defense analysts noting the doctrine “is not explicitly used” in current strategy.

Public opinion surveys show 68% of Taiwanese willing to fight if invaded, but research reveals lower tolerance for actual casualties, particularly among younger generations raised in prosperity.

Context

The gap between doctrine and implementation reflects deeper institutional resistance within Taiwan’s military establishment, which favors conventional platforms that support established career paths and prestige. This mirrors historical patterns where militaries struggle to abandon familiar force structures despite strategic logic.

Taiwan’s demographic reality amplifies casualty sensitivity. The island’s collapsed fertility rate means families increasingly face losing their only child, intensifying per-child loss aversion precisely as strategic threats worsen. Generational divides compound this challenge—older Taiwanese show higher willingness to fight than younger citizens with less memory of authoritarian rule.

Chinese influence operations specifically target Taiwanese political will through “three warfares” doctrine, treating resolve as a center of gravity to attack through sustained disinformation campaigns.

Trajectory

Taiwan’s defense challenge extends beyond acquiring the right weapons to maintaining political cohesion under pressure. Electoral cycles that treat defense as partisan issues, combined with systematic Chinese efforts to erode resolve, suggest vulnerability lies in political sustainability rather than tactical capabilities.

The asymmetric warfare pivot may address operational problems while missing the strategic question of whether Taiwan’s democratic system can sustain prolonged conflict. Beijing may calculate that waiting for political fractures offers better odds than military invasion.

Yesterday’s Assessments

• Can the australia-indonesia security treaty constrain Chinese power or does it merely formalize jakarta’s hedging strategy?
• Australia and Indonesia sign security treaties—but alignment with Jakarta remains elusive

Until tomorrow.