Trajectory Daily Brief: 03 February 2026

Indo-Pacific | Conflict | Taiwan’s indigenous submarine program races against China’s advancing anti-submarine capabilities

Situation

Taiwan is developing its first domestically-built submarines after decades of unsuccessful attempts to procure boats from foreign suppliers. The program represents a shift toward indigenous defense production as traditional arms suppliers remain reluctant to risk Beijing’s displeasure.

The submarine initiative aims to establish sea denial capability in the Taiwan Strait, potentially complicating Chinese invasion planning. However, production timelines extend years into the future while Chinese anti-submarine warfare capabilities continue rapid advancement.

Context

Submarines represent asymmetric warfare at its core—relatively inexpensive platforms that can threaten vastly more expensive surface fleets. Historical precedent from World War II demonstrates how even small submarine forces can impose disproportionate costs on larger naval powers through area denial.

Taiwan’s geographic position creates natural chokepoints where submarines could prove effective, but modern anti-submarine warfare has evolved dramatically. China’s investment in underwater sensors, maritime patrol aircraft, and advanced sonobuoys represents a technological arms race where Taiwan starts from behind.

The procurement challenges reflect broader geopolitical isolation, forcing Taiwan toward self-reliance in critical defense technologies.

Trajectory

The effectiveness window for Taiwan’s submarine program appears increasingly narrow. By the time boats enter service, Chinese detection capabilities may have advanced sufficiently to neutralize their deterrent value.

This dynamic illustrates a broader challenge facing smaller powers: indigenous defense programs require years to mature while adversaries continuously upgrade countermeasures. Taiwan’s submarine gamble may arrive too late to meaningfully alter strategic calculations.

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China | Defence | India’s hypersonic missile test creates mutual vulnerability rather than strategic advantage

Situation

India successfully tested its Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile at Mach 10 on November 16, 2024, joining the US, China, and Russia in demonstrating hypersonic anti-ship capabilities. The weapon can strike targets 1,500 kilometers away while executing terminal maneuvers to evade defenses.

However, the missile remains in development requiring further trials before deployment. China already fields operational anti-ship ballistic missiles, hypersonic glide vehicles, and cruise missiles. China’s navy operates over 370 platforms versus India’s 145 vessels, with shipbuilding capacity that dwarfs India’s production capabilities.

Context

The test occurs within an Indian Ocean already transformed by Chinese naval expansion through the “String of Pearls” strategy—establishing footholds from Gwadar to Djibouti. While India’s geography should provide natural advantages, these Chinese facilities transform the region into contested space rather than India’s sphere of influence.

Crisis stability theory suggests hypersonic weapons create “reciprocal fear of surprise attack” dynamics. Both sides now face mutual exposure rather than Indian advantage—neither can confidently project naval power without risking catastrophic losses. The weapons’ speed compresses decision timelines and creates use-it-or-lose-it pressures favoring aggression over restraint.

Nuclear ambiguity compounds the danger, as hypersonic weapons appear identical to nuclear delivery systems during flight.

Trajectory

India’s breakthrough paradoxically weakens rather than strengthens regional stability by universalizing vulnerability instead of creating dominance. The weapon fits awkwardly into India’s sea control doctrine, which requires sustained naval presence that India’s smaller fleet cannot maintain across vast ocean distances.

China’s sea denial strategy—preventing adversary operations without controlling space—better suits the new environment. India’s industrial constraints mean every resource devoted to hypersonics subtracts from shipbuilding and fleet maintenance, while China faces no such trade-offs.

The result is increased crisis instability without resolving the underlying naval balance of power.

Pacific | Indo-Pacific | Bougainville rejects Chinese mining deal due to landowner consent requirements, not geopolitical concerns

Situation

On January 30, 2026, Bougainville President Ishmael Toroama rejected a partnership with China Molybdenum Company to reopen the Panguna copper mine, one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper deposits containing 5.3 million tonnes of copper and 547 tonnes of gold.

The rejection denied Bougainville the revenue stream needed to fund independence from Papua New Guinea, which requires the autonomous region to demonstrate fiscal self-sufficiency. Currently, Bougainville generates only 5.3% of its budget internally.

CMOC’s proposal sought equity participation that would have diluted the Autonomous Bougainville Government’s 72.9% stake in Bougainville Copper Limited, threatening local control structures established after the devastating 1988-1998 civil war.

Context

The rejection stems from Bougainville’s unique landowner consent framework, not resistance to Chinese influence. The 2015 Mining Act grants customary landowners—primarily Nasioi women through matrilineal inheritance—ownership of minerals and veto power over mining operations, creating “distributed veto power” that foreign investors consistently underestimate.

This system emerged from the Panguna mine’s traumatic legacy. Operating from 1972-1989 under Rio Tinto, it generated 45% of PNG’s export earnings while poisoning local rivers and triggering a civil war that killed 10-20% of Bougainville’s population.

Chinese state-owned enterprises are poorly equipped for this environment, assuming hierarchical decision-making rather than navigating kinship networks. Unlike elsewhere in the Pacific, Beijing lacks leverage points—Bougainville has no international borrowing capacity, minimal Chinese trade, and nothing to sanction.

Trajectory

Bougainville’s rejection reveals structural limits to Chinese economic influence where traditional leverage mechanisms don’t apply. Extreme poverty paradoxically becomes a form of power—landowners can credibly threaten to keep copper underground indefinitely.

The autonomous region faces an impossible choice: accept foreign investment terms that threaten hard-won consent structures, or remain economically dependent on PNG and Australia while independence aspirations stall.

This dynamic may repeat across the Pacific where customary land tenure intersects with resource extraction, suggesting Beijing’s state-level engagement model faces systematic challenges in societies with distributed decision-making authority.

Middle East | Defence | US military capability against Iran constrained by Gulf allies denying base access

Situation

The United States maintains technical capacity to conduct military strikes against Iranian targets without relying on Gulf-based facilities. However, operational realities have significantly degraded this capability from a credible deterrent to what analysts describe as a logistical gamble.

Gulf allies are increasingly denying the US access to critical regional bases, fundamentally altering America’s military posture in the region. This shift represents a marked departure from previous decades when Gulf cooperation was assumed.

Context

Historically, US deterrence against Iran relied heavily on forward-deployed assets and guaranteed access to regional infrastructure. The Pentagon’s contingency planning traditionally assumed Gulf allies would provide basing, overflight rights, and logistical support during any Iran crisis.

The erosion of this assumption reflects broader regional realignments. Gulf states are hedging their security relationships, balancing between US partnership and avoiding Iranian retaliation. Saudi Arabia and UAE have pursued diplomatic engagement with Tehran while maintaining arms purchases from Washington.

This dynamic mirrors Cold War alliance challenges, where host nations retained veto power over US military operations despite formal security partnerships.

Trajectory

America’s Iran deterrence model requires fundamental restructuring around long-range capabilities and alternative basing arrangements. This shift favors naval assets and strategic bombers over forward-deployed forces.

Regional allies now hold effective veto power over US military options, constraining Washington’s crisis response flexibility. Iran likely recognizes this constraint, potentially emboldening more aggressive regional behavior.

The Pentagon must develop deterrence strategies that account for unreliable regional access rather than assuming Gulf cooperation.

Read the full analysis →

Yesterday’s Assessments

• Taiwan’s submarines face China’s closing acoustic window
• Taiwan’s submarine gamble: Can eight boats deter a Chinese invasion?

Until tomorrow.