Daily Brief: 31 December 2025

Indo-Pacific | Defence | China’s industrial investments signal 2035 Taiwan timeline despite Pentagon’s 2027 warning

Situation

China’s long-term capital investments reveal a strategic timeline extending well beyond the Pentagon’s 2027 readiness assessment. Beijing plans nine aircraft carriers by 2035, requiring one commissioning every eighteen months—infrastructure for sustained Pacific dominance, not immediate Taiwan action.

Semiconductor self-sufficiency remains at 13.6% equipment localization, dramatically short of 50% targets. The completed Power of Siberia pipeline and 90-day strategic petroleum reserves suggest preparation for short-term energy independence during crisis periods.

Satellite imagery at Jiangnan Shipyard shows carrier production competing with amphibious vessels for the same dock space—indicating capacity constraints inconsistent with imminent large-scale operations.

Context

The Pentagon’s “fight and win by 2027” assessment describes capability development, not operational intent. China’s investment pattern suggests building options rather than executing immediate plans. Carriers serve post-reunification power projection, not the amphibious-heavy requirements of Taiwan invasion itself.

Current vulnerabilities undermine near-term confidence. American export controls could cripple advanced chip production for years. The Malacca Strait chokepoint handles 80% of oil imports. The carrier fleet cannot project meaningful power beyond the first island chain until the mid-2030s.

Xi Jinping’s age factor matters in autocratic timelines. At 72, his realistic governance window extends through a third term to 2032, making 2035 more politically relevant than 2027 for legacy-defining actions.

Trajectory

China appears to be building prerequisites for action rather than preparing immediate operations. Semiconductor independence, diversified energy infrastructure, and blue-water naval capability converge around 2035, not 2027.

The investment triad suggests Beijing expects sustained great-power competition requiring technological resilience and global force projection. This points toward a fait accompli strategy followed by negotiated settlement rather than protracted conflict.

Military planners should prepare for 2027 capabilities while recognizing that China’s actual decision calculus likely operates on a longer timeline driven by industrial readiness rather than political declarations.

Africa | Geopolitics | Sahel junta alliance deploys 5,000 troops in coordinated offensive against jihadists

Situation

The Alliance of Sahel States announced its new unified force (FU-AES) will launch “large-scale operations” against jihadist groups in the Liptako-Gourma region. The 5,000-troop deployment represents the first major coordinated military action by Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger since their military governments formed the confederation.

The timing follows a series of territorial losses, particularly in Burkina Faso, which ceded more ground to jihadists in 2024 than any previous year. All three states have expelled French forces and exited ECOWAS following their respective coups between 2020-2023.

Context

The offensive addresses a legitimacy crisis rather than military logic. Standard counterinsurgency doctrine requires 200,000 troops for the target region’s 10 million inhabitants—the AES deploys 2.5% of that figure. These governments lack the logistics infrastructure and supply chains for sustained operations at this scale.

ECOWAS sanctions eliminated reconciliation pathways, forcing the three states into deeper integration by necessity rather than strategy. The juntas face “temporal compression”—populations experiencing active warfare discount future promises, demanding visible action now regardless of effectiveness.

This represents sovereignty as performance art, designed for multiple audiences: domestic populations seeking security improvements, regional rivals assessing AES coordination capabilities, and external patrons evaluating return on investment.

Trajectory

The operation will likely produce symbolic victories—captured villages, photo opportunities, martyrdom narratives—without achieving lasting territorial control. Success metrics focus on political capital generation rather than military outcomes.

The real test comes when inevitable tactical failures meet domestic expectations. Historical precedent suggests governments can extract legitimacy from attempting visible action, but only temporarily. The juntas have effectively eliminated fallback options, making this offensive a high-stakes performance with limited room for strategic retreat.

Yesterday’s Assessments

• Daily Brief: 30 December 2025
• The Commitment Trap
• The Precision Mirage: What Happens When GPS-Guided Weapons Meet Systematic Jamming
• The Sahel’s Sovereignty Ritual: Why the Junta Alliance Fights Wars It Cannot Win

Until tomorrow.