Daily Brief: 30 December 2025

Global | Defence | Western precision weapons lose effectiveness under systematic GPS denial in Ukraine

Situation

Russian electronic warfare units have demonstrated large-scale GPS denial capabilities in Ukraine, degrading American-supplied Excalibur artillery shells’ accuracy by 50% or more during 2023. Ukrainian forces responded by reverting to cheaper unguided munitions—not by choice, but because precision-guided systems became unreliable.

The scale of Western GPS dependency is comprehensive. Over 500,000 JDAM guidance kits have been produced, converting $2,000 gravity bombs into $25,000 precision weapons. HIMARS rockets, Tomahawk missiles, and F-35 targeting systems all assume continuous satellite access for both guidance and network synchronization.

Context

Three decades of Western military strategy centered on precision-guided munitions justified smaller stockpiles and reduced industrial capacity. The logic was simple: why maintain ten weapons when one precise weapon could accomplish the same mission? This efficiency assumption shaped everything from doctrine to budgets to training.

The physics favor jammers decisively. GPS satellites transmit at 25 watts from 20,000 kilometers altitude, creating extremely weak signals that require only kilowatts to overwhelm. Russia’s Krasukha-4 systems can jam GPS across hundreds of kilometers at relatively low cost.

The institutional knowledge for employing unguided weapons effectively has atrophied. Artillery crews trained on GPS-guided systems lack expertise in manual ballistic calculations. Pilots who never dropped unguided bombs in combat must rediscover abandoned techniques.

Trajectory

GPS modernization efforts have failed to solve the fundamental vulnerability. The M-code signal designed for jam resistance remains years behind schedule, with the ground control system originally planned for 2013 still incomplete in 2024.

Western militaries face a structural dilemma: precision weapons created efficiency gains that enabled smaller forces and stockpiles, but GPS denial forces reversion to volume-based approaches that existing infrastructure cannot support. The capability gap extends beyond equipment to human capital that requires years to reconstitute.

Africa | Geopolitics | Sahel juntas launch joint military force as legitimacy ritual rather than viable counterinsurgency strategy

Situation

Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso launched their unified military force (FU-AES) on December 20, 2025, promising “large-scale operations” against jihadist groups across the tri-border region. The 5,000-strong force represents the Alliance of Sahel States’ first coordinated military action since the three juntas formalized their partnership.

The timing coincides with their formal ECOWAS withdrawal in January 2025, following sanctions that severed the states from regional financial infrastructure. Russia has provided weapons and Wagner mercenaries (rebranded as Africa Corps), while China offers equipment and infrastructure investment.

Each junta seized power between 2020-2023 promising security that elected governments could not deliver, but none controls their territory effectively.

Context

The offensive operates as “performative sovereignty”—asserting state control through military action regardless of tactical outcomes. Standard counterinsurgency doctrine requires 100,000 troops for the Liptako-Gourma region’s 5 million inhabitants; the announced force is twenty times smaller than needed.

The juntas face a “metabolic logic” problem: external support from Russia and China represents temporary energy that must be converted into visible action before it dissipates. ECOWAS sanctions eliminated alternatives, forcing deeper AES integration as the only path to economic survival.

Unlike expelled Western forces that provided air support, intelligence, and logistics, Russia’s Africa Corps is optimized for resource extraction security rather than territorial counterinsurgency. Meanwhile, jihadist groups have built governance structures woven into local social fabric.

Trajectory

The offensive’s success is secondary to its existence as justification for continued military rule. Optimal outcomes involve perpetual campaign—enough activity to sustain emergency narratives without resolving the underlying crisis that legitimizes junta governance.

When operations stall, the juntas will likely blame external sabotage while deepening dependence on Russian and Chinese patrons. This creates a sovereignty paradox: performing independence through actions that increase foreign dependence.

The real test comes when external support wanes and domestic populations demand results the juntas cannot deliver.

Yesterday’s Assessments

• Daily Brief: 29 December 2025
• The Quiet Realignment: How Australia and Indonesia Are Rewriting Indo-Pacific Security
• The Quarry’s Revenge: Can Australia Break China’s Rare Earth Stranglehold?
• The Nuclear Mirage: Why Australia Can’t Actually Maintain Nuclear Submarines
• The Sacrificial Fleet

Until tomorrow.