Daily Brief: 25 December 2025

Africa | Crisis | Sudan’s 14 million displaced fail to trigger intervention despite exceeding thresholds that prompted action elsewhere

Situation

Sudan’s conflict has displaced over 14 million people and triggered famine across five regions, with the US formally declaring genocide. Yet international response remains minimal—limited to vetoed UN resolutions and underfunded humanitarian appeals.

This stands in stark contrast to smaller crises that prompted major interventions. NATO acted in Libya when deaths numbered in thousands. France deployed to Mali during a nascent emergency. Kosovo intervention addressed displacement in hundreds of thousands, not tens of millions.

Context

The disparity reveals how intervention architecture has fundamentally shifted since 2011. Russia’s November 2024 veto of Sudan resolutions demonstrates the “atrocity shield” effect—great powers now systematically block action regardless of crisis severity. Libya’s intervention success came through Russian-Chinese abstention, a mistake both powers vow never to repeat.

Sudan’s bilateral atrocity pattern complicates intervention narratives. Unlike Libya’s clear dictator-versus-people frame, both SAF and RSF commit documented war crimes, creating “metis problems” that resist institutional categorization.

Economic interests entrench the conflict. UAE gold imports from Sudan surged 70% in 2024, creating vertically integrated extraction systems that fund RSF operations while making Gulf allies complicit in continuation rather than resolution.

Trajectory

Sudan represents intervention architecture’s effective death. The Libya model—Security Council authorization for humanitarian action—cannot survive systematic great power obstruction and complex conflict realities.

Future crises will face the “Sudan precedent”: if 14 million displaced and declared genocide cannot trigger response, no threshold remains meaningful. The international system has quietly abandoned responsibility-to-protect without formally declaring its end.

Pacific | Europe | Russia demonstrates capability to systematically blind Starlink terminals supporting Ukraine operations

Situation

Russian electronic warfare systems achieved systematic disruption of Starlink communications supporting Ukrainian military operations beginning May 2024. The Kalinka system and Tobol installations now target signals between Starlink satellites and ground terminals across eastern Ukraine, moving beyond intermittent jamming to reliable operational degradation.

Over 50,000 Starlink terminals process Ukrainian artillery targeting, drone operations, and command coordination. Ukrainian forces fire 6,000 daily artillery rounds with precision that compensates for Russia’s 20,000-round volume advantage through network-enabled targeting.

NATO’s support architecture through logistics hubs in Poland and Romania has embedded Starlink dependency into training, doctrine, and materiel coordination systems processing 18,000 tons monthly.

Context

Starlink evolved from communications enhancement to the nervous system of Ukrainian military operations. The constellation enables decision speeds that make traditional military satellite communications appear obsolete—seconds versus hours for targeting coordination.

This dependency extends to US Pacific operations under Agile Combat Employment doctrine. The Air Force installed Starlink on C-130J aircraft at Yokota Air Base, Japan, while Navy units use the system for missile testing. Pacific dispersal strategies assume persistent connectivity across oceanic distances where alternatives prove scarcer than in Europe.

The Pentagon’s 2024 Commercial Space Integration Strategy explicitly embraced commercial solutions integration rather than mere augmentation of government systems. China has observed Russian electronic warfare techniques against Starlink with professional interest, creating capability transfer potential.

Trajectory

“At will” disruption capability transforms strategic calculations. Reliable electromagnetic denial enables adversaries to control information warfare tempo rather than merely respond to it.

Pacific operations face amplified vulnerability compared to Ukraine. Marine units on contested islands and dispersed Air Force squadrons cannot fall back on terrestrial alternatives available near NATO logistics hubs.

The demonstrated ability to systematically degrade Starlink creates planning assumptions for both theaters. US operational concepts built on persistent connectivity now require alternative architectures or acceptance of degraded capability during peer conflict.

Yesterday’s Assessments

• The Alliance That Cannot Win
• The Venezuela Deployment: Why America’s Mismatch Is the Message
• When the Network Goes Dark: Starlink’s Vulnerability and the Future of Western Military Power
• The Killer Instinct: What Made Donald Trump
• The Cornered Rat: What Made Vladimir Putin
• The Cave and the Crown: What Made Xi Jinping
• Daily Brief: 24 December 2025
• The Sahel’s Sovereignty Mirage: Russia, Juntas, and the Limits of Liberation

Until tomorrow.